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 When thinking about potential threats to free will, people tend to think big. If there is 
an essentially omniscient and everlasting God, for example, then what God believed 
millions of years ago about the future entails every true proposition about what we’re up 
to now, and since it’s not up to any of us what God believed millions of years ago, what 
we’re up to now isn’t up to any of us, either (Pike 1965). Alternatively, if causal deter-
minism is true, then the laws that govern our world, together with facts about how the 
world was millions of years ago, entail every true proposition about what we’re up to 
now, and since it’s not up to any of us what the laws are like or what the world was like 
millions of years ago, what we’re up to now isn’t up to any of us, either (van Inwagen 
1983). Finally,—and I mention one last example here because we’ll return to it later—
even if there is no God, presumably there were, millions of years ago, true future-tensed 
statements about what we would be up to millions of years later, and those true future-
tensed statements entail(ed) all the present-tense propositions about what we’re up to 
now. Again, since it’s not up to us what was true millions of years ago, what we’re up to 
now isn’t up to us, either (Taylor 1963). 
 These three threats to free will—the threat from logical determinism, causal deter-
minism, and God’s foreknowledge—are all  global threats, because they are general 
theses about the nature of reality whose alleged consequences would be disastrous for 
every creature whatsoever. But there are  local threats to free will that are worth con-
sidering, too, puzzles about relatively well-circumscribed portions of reality that appear 
to threaten this or that person’s free will. In this chapter, I intend to explore one of 
these more modest threats, one that arises from endorsing the possibility of time travel 
to the past. 
 Most discussions of free will and time travel occur in contexts where what’s at issue 
is whether time travel is metaphysically possible. In those contexts, the worry is that if 
it were possible for someone to travel to the past, then contradictions could be true. For 
example, the time traveler would be able to kill his grandfather (because he would train 
for the occasion, he would have a gun, he would know where to fi nd his grandfather, 
etc.), and also would not be able to kill his grandfather (because if he were to kill his 
grandfather, then he himself wouldn’t exist to travel back in time in the fi rst place). 
There seems to be general agreement, at least in the last 40 years, that these sorts of 
worries do not show that time travel to the past is metaphysically impossible (Lewis 
1976; R. Wasserman, unpublished manuscript, “ The Paradoxes of Time Travel ”). I agree, 
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but I am not concerned with whether time travel is metaphysically possible. Instead, 
I plan to take for granted that it  is , and then ask what it would mean for the free will of 
the time traveler. It’s a common thought that time travelers to the past would somehow 
be constrained to do only those things that they in fact did do, that they wouldn’t be 
free to do anything that didn’t already happen. That is, it’s a common thought that we 
should be  incompatibilists about free will and time travel to the past. (Note that this is a 
different sense of the term ‘incompatibilist’ than is typical in debates about free will 
and, say, determinism.) But is this common thought right? 
 In what follows, I’ll suggest that the answer to this question is complicated. On 
the traditional way of thinking about free will, I think the incompatibilist about time 
travel and free will wins the day. However, I’ll also consider a residual worry with the 
incompatibilist conclusion, one that contains the seeds of a new—and, I think, more 
promising—way of thinking about free will, about what it is for an action to be up to 
someone. 
 Models of Time Travel 
 To begin, let’s distinguish between three different models for travelling to the past: the 
single timeline model, the branching timeline model, and the hypertime model. We’ll 
be concerned with the single timeline model, but I’ll briefl y describe the others for the 
sake of contrast. To understand the models, I fi nd it useful to assume that spacetime is a 
four-dimensional block, which contains every spatiotemporal thing that has ever, does 
now, or will ever exist. (I say that I fi nd this assumption useful, but let me hasten to add 
that it is dispensable [Keller and Nelson 2001; van Inwagen 2010].) You and I are in the 
block, but so are Abraham Lincoln and the people whose birth year is 2115. Now sup-
pose that Harry is born in 2100, enters a time machine in the year 2120 and travels back 
100 years to 2020, shakes his grandfather’s hand, and then goes back to the future, 
arriving one minute after he left. 
 On the single timeline model, if you imagine scanning the four-dimensional space-
time block from left to right, starting at the year 2019, here’s what you would see (you’ll 
have to suppress a couple of spatial dimensions in your mind’s eye): in the year 2020, a 
20-year-old Harry appears, with his time machine, seemingly out of nowhere. He exits 
his time machine, fi nds his grandfather, and shakes his hand. Then he re-enters the 
time machine and disappears. Harry’s grandfather then grows up, gets married, and has 
children (one of whom is Harry’s mother), and then little baby Harry himself is born in 
2100, grows into a time travel enthusiast who fi nally enters a time machine in the year 
2120, and then disappears with his time machine. After a minute passes (you’re still 
scanning the block left-to-right), Harry and his time machine reappear (both are more 
than a minute older), Harry exits, and he goes about his life. On this model, Harry does 
not cause anything to happen in the past that didn’t (already) happen in the past. It 
may sound odd, but as Harry departs, we can truly say of him that he is about to expe-
rience an event that has already taken place. (Does that mean that the event is both 
future and past? Yes and no. If we’re talking about  external time, the event Harry is 
about to experience is only past. But if we’re talking about Harry’s  personal time [the 
ordering of his life experiences from younger to older], then the event is only future [see 
Lewis 1976].) 
 The branching timeline model, on the other hand, promises to open up the possibility 
that what the time traveler does on his journey into the past is different than what 
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happened ‘the fi rst time around.’ (On the single timeline model, there is only one ‘time 
around.’) To picture things on the branching timeline model, we can again imagine a 
four-dimensional block universe, except now it has a branching structure. There is a 
single trunk from the beginning of time until the year 2020, but at 2020 the trunk sports 
a branch, so that the four-dimensional block universe at that point looks like a ‘y’ that 
has been laid on its side. The trunk, as it continues past the sprouted branch, contains 
the ‘fi rst time around,’ where Harry’s grandfather lives out his life  sans handshake. But 
the sprouted branch contains the ‘second time around,’ where Harry arrives in his time 
machine and shakes his grandfather’s hand. (I’ll ignore the very good question of 
whether this story really counts as time travel.) 
 Finally, consider the hypertime model (Goddu 2003; van Inwagen 2010; Hudson 
2014). The idea here is that in addition to the sequence of moments  within the four-
dimensional spacetime block itself, there is also a sequence of hypermoments (moments 
in a second-dimension of time) through which the very shape of the spacetime block 
might morph and change. Picture it this way: you are outside of the spacetime block 
(with a God’s-eye perspective on all of spatiotemporal reality—past, present, and future) 
and you have a reel-to-reel video camera. As hypertime passes (for you, who are outside 
of the spatiotemporal block), you are capturing what the block looks like from hyper-
moment to hypermoment. (Each hypermoment is represented by a frame on your 
fi lmstrip.) If the spacetime block hypernever changes its shape, then you are fi lming a 
rather boring movie—just like staring at a loaf of bread that never rots (so, perhaps like 
staring at a Twinkie). But once we have the idea of hypertime, we can use it to imagine 
a shapeshifting block. Truths about what is (simply)  past are always about what the 
leftward sections of the spacetime block contains, but truths about what is  hyperpast 
are about what the fi lled-up frames on your fi lmstrip represent the spacetime block as 
(hyper)having contained at those frames. To imagine time travel on this model, all we 
have to do is to imagine that what the spacetime block contains at one hypermoment 
is different from what it contains at the next hypermoment. At the fi rst hypermoment, 
the block contains a grandfather who never got to meet his grandson. But at the next 
hypermoment, the spacetime block contains not only the 20-year-old Harry who is 
spooling up his time machine in the year 2120, but also a slightly older Harry who 
is shaking hands with his grandfather in the year 2020. (The contents of the 2020 slice 
of the spacetime block have changed from what they hyperwere.) 
 The particular (local) incompatibilist argument I’ll consider arises most naturally 
(or, perhaps, only) on the single timeline model of time travel. I’ve sketched the 
others only for the sake of contrast, so that the reader doesn’t automatically begin 
thinking in terms of the  Back to the Future movie franchise, with its fading photo-
graphs and changing of the past. The worry for free will that arises in the context of 
single timeline time travel arises in part because of the natural thought that we  can’t 
change the past. 
 A Worrisome Time Travel Story 
 To home in on the worry I have in mind, let’s talk about another Harry, this one from 
 Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban (Rowling 2001). Here’s the background you 
need: Harry is a wizard who knows how to cast a spell to ward off dark creatures called 
Dementors (the spell is called a Patronus), and he has a friend named Hermione who 
has a device called a timeturner, which looks like a charm necklace but which allows its 
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wearer(s) to travel through time. And here’s how our story goes (told from the perspec-
tive of Harry’s personal time): at  t 1 Harry’s life is threatened by several Dementors, but 
at  t 2 he is saved because someone lurking in the shadows casts a Patronus spell at the 
Dementors. Hours later, at  t 3 , he and Hermione use a timeturner to travel back to  t 1 , 
where Harry sees himself (his younger self) threatened by the Dementors. At  t 2 , Harry 
casts a Patronus spell at the Dementors, thus saving his own life. Just before  t 3 , Harry 
and Hermione use the timeturner to travel back to the future, and they arrive just in 
time to see themselves (their younger selves) disappearing at  t 3 to begin their adven-
tures in the past. 
 This is a single timeline story of time travel to the past. Harry saves his own life at  t 2 , 
and because he does, it is true at  t 3 that he saved his own life, even though the younger 
version of him at  t 3 (the one about to head back in time) doesn’t realize that this is what 
happened (he knows  someone saved his life, but he doesn’t know it was/will be  him ). As 
the story unfolds in the book, the realization that the person in the shadows was (is) 
himself is liberating. As Harry puts it (Rowling 2001: 412), “I knew I could do it [i.e. 
cast the Patronus spell] this time because I’d already done it!” In other words, since he 
knew that he  would save himself (talking from his perspective before casting the spell, 
but with the knowledge that he had lived long enough to travel back in time), he knew 
that he was  able to save himself. This realization is, in fact, what  enabled him (perhaps 
it’s what allowed him to summon the necessary concentration). But by the same token, 
we might wonder whether saving his own life was a free action of his—whether, given 
the peculiar circumstances, it really was up to him whether he cast the Patronus. After 
all, had he failed to cast the Patronus, he wouldn’t have survived the Dementor attack, 
and hence wouldn’t exist to even be faced with the choice of whether to save himself. 
 Lest we think that this sort of worry only arises for agents who are in the midst of a 
time-travelling adventure, it’s worth pointing out that there is another question that 
arises from the story as we have told it, namely: was Harry’s action of travelling back in 
time at  t 3 a free action? At  t 3 , (younger) Harry has not yet experienced the thrill of 
traveling through time. But the fact that he will soon arrive in the past and save his 
own life leads to uncomfortable questions about his freedom just the same. After all, 
had he failed to travel back in time, nobody would have been in the shadows ready to 
save him from the Dementor attack (we can stipulate that Hermione, even if she were 
to have traveled to the past alone, wouldn’t have been able to cast a strong enough 
Patronus), and so he wouldn’t exist to even be faced with the choice of whether to 
go back in time. The puzzle to be considered in what follows isn’t only about the free 
will  of time travelers while they are time traveling ; rather, it’s about free will, given the 
possibility of time travel. 
 On the traditional model of thinking about free will, whether an action is up 
to someone (i.e., whether it is free) is a matter of whether the person is both  able to 
perform the action and also  able to refrain from performing it (van Inwagen 1983). 
Adopting that model for the moment, our questions about Harry become:
 Q1: At  t 2 , is (older) Harry able to refrain from casting the Patronus? 
 Q2: At  t 3 , is (younger) Harry able to refrain from going back in time? 
 It seems to me that these questions will have the same answer, so for ease of exposition 
I will focus only on Q2. 
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 Time Travel and Fatalism 
 In the previous section, I sketched the argument for the conclusion that Harry isn’t able 
to refrain from travelling back in time at  t 3 . But the sketch I gave relied on some unstated 
premises that are best brought into the open. So consider how we might regiment the 
argument:
1.  (Older) Harry casts the Patronus at  t 2 . 
2.  Necessarily, (older) Harry casts the Patronus at  t 2 only if he travels back in time at 
 t 3 (where  t 2 is externally past, relative to  t 3 ). 
3.  So, if Harry hadn’t traveled back in time at  t 3 , then some fact about the past would 
have been false. 
4.  If, in order for S to do A, some fact about the past would have to be false, then 
S isn’t able to do A. 
5.  Therefore, Harry isn’t able to refrain from travelling back in time at  t 3 . 
 The crucial ingredient of this argument is premise (4), which captures the idea that the 
past is fi xed—that is, the past is not something that anyone is able to do anything about 
anymore. (No use crying over spilled milk, and all that.) This premise—we might call 
it The Principle of the Fixity of the Past (FP)—plays a crucial role in the global incom-
patibilist arguments we canvassed at the beginning of this chapter, so it shouldn’t be 
surprising that it shows up in this context too. It’s precisely because God’s beliefs are  in 
the past that they seem to cause trouble for free will, and it’s precisely because the thesis 
of causal determinism implies that our actions are entailed  by the past and  the laws 
(which also seemed fi xed) that it seems to cause trouble for free will. (Note that I’m 
using the word ‘entail’ in a broadened sense throughout this chapter: something of one 
ontological category entails something of a different ontological category, in this sense, 
if it’s not metaphysically possible for the fi rst thing to obtain [or exist, or happen, or be 
true, etc.] without the second thing obtaining [or existing, or happening, or being true, 
etc.].) Likewise, what’s causing trouble for Harry here is that there are facts about the 
past that seem to entail what he does. And things are even worse for Harry, because the 
fact that he’s a time traveler means that he has  two pasts—the external past and his 
personal past—and both contain events that entail his actions at future times (times in 
the external future and times in his personal future). 
 So how can a compatibilist about time travel and free will respond? David Lewis is 
perhaps the Platonic Ideal of a compatibilist, and what he would say is that this argu-
ment is “a bit of fatalist trickery” (Lewis 1976). His remarks explaining that verdict are 
worth quoting in full:
 Fatalists—the best of them—are philosophers who take facts we count as irrele-
vant in saying what someone can do, disguise them somehow as facts of a differ-
ent sort that we count as relevant, and thereby argue that we can do less than we 
think . . . I am not going to vote Republican next fall. The fatalist argues that, 
strange to say, I not only won’t but can’t; for my voting Republican is not com-
possible with the fact that it was true already [in the past] that I was not going to 
vote Republican . . . My rejoinder is that this is a fact, sure enough; however, it is 
an irrelevant fact about the future masquerading as a relevant fact about the 
past, and so should be left out of account in saying what, in any ordinary sense, 
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I can do. We are unlikely to be fooled by the fatalist’s methods of disguise in this 
case, or other ordinary cases. But in cases of time travel, precognition, or the 
like, we’re on less familiar ground, so it may take less of a disguise to fool us. Also, 
new methods of disguise are available, thanks to the device of personal time. 
 (Lewis 1976: 151) 
 The fatalist is someone who worries that since future-tensed propositions about our 
actions were true millions of years ago, and since the past truth of those propositions 
entails the present truth about what we are up to now, we don’t have free will with 
respect to anything that we ever do. What Lewis is saying in the above quotation, how-
ever, is that some facts that  appear to be about the past aren’t  really about the past; they 
are simply masquerading. In particular,  all of the facts that the fatalist points to—facts 
about which future-tensed propositions were true millions of years ago—are not genuinely 
about the past. Since they aren’t, Lewis says that we shouldn’t take them into consider-
ation when trying to determine what I’m able to do in the here and now. 
 Another way of saying this is to say that since those facts aren’t genuinely about the 
past, they aren’t covered by The Principle of the Fixity of the Past. More carefully 
stated, (FP) only applies to facts that are genuinely about the past, and not every fact 
that was  true in the past is really  about the past. In the language of Ockhamism (Pike 
1965; Fischer 1989), there’s a distinction to be drawn between  soft and  hard facts—facts 
that are temporally relational (soft) versus facts that are temporally intrinsic (hard)—
and it’s only the  hard facts that are plausibly thought to be fi xed. So (FP) should really 
be more carefully stated as the Principle of the Fixity of the Hard Past:
 (FHP) If, in order for S to do A, some hard fact about the past would have to 
be false, then S is not able to do A. 
 But now if  this principle appears as premise (4) in the above argument, then the argument 
turns out to be invalid. The ‘past fact’ that entails that Harry travels back in time at  t 3 —
namely, the fact that (older) Harry casts a Patronus at  t 2 —is a temporally relational (soft) 
fact, since whether it obtains depends crucially on what happens in the future. In particu-
lar, whether Harry casts the Patronus at  t 2 depends on whether he goes back in time at  t 3 . 
So, although it is a fact that obtains at  t 2 , it’s not wholly  about t 2 , and hence isn’t one of 
the facts that we need to hold fi xed when deciding what Harry is able to do at  t 3 . 
 All this is a way of saying: if Ockhamism seems like a good solution to the problem 
of logical fatalism—and to many people, it does—then it’s also a good solution to the 
puzzle about time travel and free will. In cases of time travel, past and future go all 
topsy-turvy, but if we carefully separate personal past from external past, and soft past 
from hard past, then we should be able to sort things out properly, and we’ll end up 
compatibilists. What’s tricky is just that some of the time traveler’s personal past lies in 
the external future (and so need not be held fi xed, even though it’s past in some sense), 
and some of the time traveler’s personal future lies in the external past (and so may be 
a soft fact that need not be held fi xed, even though it’s in the external past). 
 Incompatibilism Revived 
 Pointing out that sometimes facts about the future masquerade as facts about the past 
is helpful in responding to fatalism, and it’s also helpful in giving a fi rst response to the 
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incompatibilist worry about time travel. But there seems to be something  else that’s 
worrisome about time travel, even once we do our best to avoid being fooled by fatalist 
trickery. We can bring out this additional worry by comparing the following two 
questions:
1.  Suppose it was true a million years ago that I will have a cup of coffee tomorrow 
morning. If I’m nevertheless able to refrain, then it must be possible for me to 
refrain. What would the world be like if I were to refrain? 
2.  Suppose that (older Harry) did cast the Patronus at  t 2 . If Harry is nevertheless able 
to refrain from going back in time at  t 3 , then it must be possible for him to refrain. 
What would the world be like if he  were to refrain? 
 The fi rst question seems like it has a relatively straightforward answer: if I were to refrain 
from having that cup of coffee, then something that was in fact true would be false. 
That thought is perhaps initially worrying, but once we make the distinction between 
hard and soft facts, the worry dissolves. If I were to refrain from having that cup of 
coffee, only some  soft fact about the past would be false. 
 But the answer to the second question, while equally straightforward, seems much 
more worrisome. If Harry were to refrain from going back in time at  t 3 , then he would 
have died at an earlier time, and hence wouldn’t have existed at  t 3 . But if he hadn’t 
existed at  t 3 , then he wouldn’t have been around to  do anything at  t 3 , and hence wouldn’t 
have been around to refrain from going back in time at  t 3 . Since Harry’s very existence 
at  t 3 seems to rely on something he is about to do in his personal future, this situation 
seems more puzzling than the one above. But what exactly is the problem? 
 To see what it is, consider the following two principles, neither of which seems to 
rely on the thought that the past is fi xed, but both of which seem to generate the incom-
patibilist worry nonetheless (Vihvelin 1996; Spencer 2013).
 (KV) S is able to do A only if, had S tried to do A, S would or at least might 
have succeeded. 
 (JS) S is able to refrain from doing A only if, had S not done A, S would have 
done something else instead. 
 Both principles specify necessary conditions on someone’s being able to do something, 
and in each case the necessary condition is that certain counterfactual should come 
out true. According to (KV), roughly, in order for S to be able to do A, there must be 
some relatively nearby world in which S tries to do A and succeeds. The thought here 
is that if S doesn’t do A but nevertheless  could have , then a world in which S does 
A must have been  accessible to her. And although the notion of accessibility is admit-
tedly obscure, it seems clear enough that if she wouldn’t succeed in doing A, even if 
she had tried, then she lacks access to a world in which she does A—that is, she wasn’t 
able to do A. 
 But you might worry about putting too much weight on the notion of  trying (Vranas 
2010), in which case principle (JS) can do the same work. Imagine we’re in a world in 
which S does A, and we’re wondering whether S was able to do otherwise. The thought 
behind principle (JS) is that it’s not enough to fi nd nearby worlds in which it’s false that 
S does A, because there are two ways that it can be false that S does A. First, and most 
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naturally, S might do something else. But another way it could turn out false that S does 
A is if S doesn’t exist, and so isn’t around to do anything at all. What principle (JS) says 
is that those worlds without S don’t count when it comes to determining whether S was 
able to do otherwise. If there isn’t an accessible world where S is doing something other 
than A, then S isn’t able to do anything other than A. 
 Focusing on principle (JS), let’s now return to Harry. In fact, Harry traveled back in 
time at  t 3 , but if he hadn’t, what would he have been doing instead? It’s seems like we 
have to say that there’s  nothing he would have been doing instead, because the nearby 
worlds in which he doesn’t go back in time at  t 3 are worlds in which younger Harry dies 
at  t 2 and hence are worlds in which there is no older Harry at  t 3 at all. But what this 
means is that if principle (JS) is true, then Harry is not able to refrain from traveling 
back in time at  t 3 . In the form of an argument:
1.  Harry is able to refrain from traveling back in time at  t 3 only if, had Harry not 
traveled back in time at  t 3 , he would have done something else instead. 
2.  But if Harry had not traveled back in time at  t 3 , then he would not have existed at 
 t 3 (and so wouldn’t have been doing something else). 
3.  It’s possible that Harry doesn’t travel back in time at  t 3 (since it’s possible that Harry 
never existed at all). (On why this premise is needed, see Spencer 2013.) 
4.  So, it’s not the case that, had Harry not traveled back in time at  t 3 , then he would 
have done something else instead. 
5.  Therefore, Harry is not able to refrain from traveling back in time at  t 3 . 
 If this argument relies on any sort of fatalist trickery, it’s at least not obvious what the 
trick is. Instead, what it seems to rely on is a rather plausible principle that specifi es a 
necessary condition on someone’s being able to refrain from doing something, along 
with a couple of other plausible counterfactuals. Of course, it’s controversial how to 
evaluate counterfactuals like those that appear in the premises of this argument (Lewis 
1973), but there doesn’t seem to be anything special about these. 
 So, Lewis is right that we don’t ordinarily hold soft facts fi xed when deciding what 
someone is able to do. Nevertheless, claims about what people are able to do seem to 
require the truth of some rather mundane counterfactuals, and those counterfactuals 
come out false in time travel scenarios. The incompatibilist challenge can be revived 
even once it is liberated of its fatalist attire. 
 A Residual Worry 
 One bothersome aspect of the incompatibilist conclusion is that it seems to commit us 
to the existence of “strange shackles” on the time traveler. That’s Ted Sider’s phrase, 
and he continues: “once the inability of the time traveler to kill her former self is admit-
ted, one wonders what prevents her from doing so” (Sider 2002: 122). Surely we don’t 
have to suppose that there is some “guardian of logic” (2002: 132) that disables the time 
traveler from doing things we would ordinarily say non-time-travelers could do. 
 One way we might respond to this worry is to point out that the arguments that have 
been given for the conclusion that time travelers  are able to kill their grandfathers all 
fail (R. Wasserman, unpublished manuscript, “ The Paradoxes of Time Travel ”). Another 
way would be to say that the notion of freedom is, after all, a modal notion, so it 
shouldn’t be at all surprising if it turns out that truths about what would happen if things 
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were different render an agent unfree, even if there seems to be no  mechanism by which 
his lack of freedom is secured (but see Byerly 2014). 
 But I actually think that there is a way of refi ning the “strange shackles” objection to 
give it more force. And the way in which we refi ne it will, in fact, lead us to an alterna-
tive model of what it is for an action to be  up to an agent—that is, to a model of free will 
that is different from the model according to which free will is a matter of being both 
able to perform an action and able to refrain. On this new model, compatibilism about 
time travel and free will can (perhaps) be resurrected. 
 Entailment vs. Sourcehood 
 The big incompatibilist worries mentioned at the outset all share a structure: in each 
case, there is something that’s not up to anyone but that seems to be the source of what 
everyone does. But the worries as I outlined them above invoked the notion of  entail-
ment , and we might wonder whether entailment is a legitimate and worrying sense of 
 sourcehood . That is, I’ve presupposed that when  p entails  q , there’s nothing wrong with 
saying that  p is the  source of  q . But is that right? 
 To see why we might doubt it, consider again the distinction between hard and soft 
facts. The response to the logical fatalist, and to the argument for time travel incompati-
bilism that we considered at fi rst, is that the facts at issue are actually only  soft facts 
about the past, and thus that the Principle of the Fixity of the Past, once properly under-
stood as applying only to hard facts about the past, doesn’t show us that they are fi xed. 
More work would need to be done in order to show that those facts  aren’t fi xed, of 
course, but here’s one observation that takes us some distance toward that conclusion: 
those past facts about what I will go on to do are true, if they are true at all, at least partly 
in virtue of what I do in the future. In other words, those past facts aren’t the  source of 
what I do. If anything, the explanatory relationship is the other way around. 
 What this observation shows us, if it’s right, is that some fact about the past might 
entail what I do without being the source of what I do. (Similar considerations will be 
at play in the debate about causal determinism and free will if we are inclined to adopt 
a Humean view of the laws of nature [Beebee and Mele 2002].) So, it doesn’t follow 
from the fact that my actions are entailed by some fact about the past that fact about the 
past isn’t at least partly up to me. Although I don’t have the space here to argue for the 
point, I’m inclined to think that what’s central to a proper understanding of free will 
aren’t facts about whether an agent is able to do otherwise, but rather facts about 
whether the allegedly free actions occur in virtue of relevant facts about me and my 
mental states. What’s worrisome about the thesis of causal determinism (if we don’t go 
Humean about the laws) is that if it is true, my actions seem to occur in virtue of stuff 
that isn’t me. And that’s precisely why God’s foreknowledge has seemed less worrisome 
to many, because his beliefs—even if he held them millions of years ago—are what they 
are at least partly in virtue of what I do in the future (Todd 2013; Tognazzini 2015). 
 But now return to the “strange shackles” worry. I submit that the motivation behind 
this worry is the thought that although the time travel story might show us that a fact 
about the past (namely, Harry’s casting the Patronus at  t 2 ) entails that Harry will travel 
back in time at  t 3 , nothing about the time travel story seems to suggest that there’s 
anything  beyond Harry himself that is the source of Harry’s decision to travel back in 
time at  t 3 . The reason that literal shackles can disable us isn’t simply the fact that our 
being in them entails that we won’t perform certain actions. Rather, it’s that our not 
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performing those actions is  explained by the fact that we are in shackles, together with 
the fact that the shackles are something outside of our own agency (cf. Frankfurt 1969). 
So if you fi nd it bizarre that Harry could somehow be rendered unfree merely by the fact 
that his future self did something in the past which entails that he’ll perform a certain 
action in the present, then perhaps what’s worrying you is that it’s  Harry’s actions them-
selves that are doing the entailing, and surely Harry can’t be ‘shackled’ by something 
that he himself does. (Well, I suppose that Ulysses does tie himself to the mast. But the 
point is that shackles are worrisome for free will only when they aren’t self-imposed and 
nevertheless do explanatory work.) 
 So, what I’d like to suggest in closing is that the “strange shackles” objection, once 
properly understood, actually points us toward a different conception of free will, one 
according to which what matters is not whether an agent is able to do otherwise, but 
whether the action occurs  in virtue of some relevant facts about the agent and his mental 
states. It’s puzzling to conclude that Harry lacks free will, precisely because it looks like 
 he is involved in everything that allegedly constrains him. And how could he be his own 
shackles? If truths about abilities are governed by principles such as (JS), and questions 
about free will are questions about abilities, then Harry can be shackled by actions that 
lie in his personal future. To revive compatibilism, we could always try to fi nd some way 
to reject (JS). But what I’m suggesting is that maybe a better way to go is to reject the 
link between free will and the ability to do otherwise. Perhaps my actions can be  up to 
me even though I’m not able to refrain from performing them. Unfortunately, though, 
I don’t have space to do any more than simply leave that as a suggestion. 
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